We give the first composable security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribution with coherent states against collective attacks. Crucially, in the limit of large blocks the secret key rate converges to the usual value computed from the Holevo bound. Combining our proof with either the de Finetti theorem or the Postselection technique then shows the security of the protocol against general attacks, thereby confirming the long-standing conjecture that Gaussian attacks are optimal asymptotically in the composable security framework.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic primitive that allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, who have access to an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel, to distill a secret key. QKD has spurred a lot of interest in the past decades because it is arguably the first application of the field of quantum information to reach commercial maturity [1] . Despite a lot of effort invested in the theoretical analysis of QKD protocols, composable security [2, 3] has only been established for a handful of protocols, for instance BB84 [4] . This major achievement is the latest step in a series of more and more refined security proofs and improved bounds for the secret key rates. More precisely, composable security proofs have successively used an exponential version of the de Finetti theorem [5] , the Postselection technique [6] and an entropic uncertainty principle [7] .
The situation for continuous-variable (CV) protocols is much less advanced [8] . These protocols [9, 10] , which do not require single-photon detectors, are particularly appealing in terms of implementation [11] but their security is still far from being completely understood. Recently, a composable security proof for a CV protocol was obtained [12] [13] [14] from an entropic uncertainty principle [15] but the protocol requires the generation of squeezed states and is only moderately tolerant to losses. Other approaches to establish the security of a protocol typically consist of two independent steps: first a composable security proof valid against collective attacks, a restricted type of attacks where the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob protocol displays a tensor product structure, followed by an additional argument to obtain security against general attacks. These two steps have been partially completed in the case of CV protocols: a reduction from general to collective attacks is obtained via two possible techniques, namely a de Finetti theorem [16] , and the Postselection technique [17] , the latter technique being more efficient but at the price of adding an un- * Electronic address: anthony.leverrier@inria.fr practical symmetrization step to the protocol [41] . Unfortunately, security against collective attacks has only been proved (via a Gaussian optimality argument [18] ) in the asymptotic limit, which does not say anything about composable security [19] [20] [21] . Note also that finite-size effects for CV QKD were partly explored in Ref. [22] , but under a Gaussian attack assumption.
In this paper, we give the first composable security proof valid against collective attacks for CV QKD with coherent states and either direct or reverse reconciliation [23] . The Postselection technique then implies composable security against general attacks. Remarkably, the secret key rate is asymptotically equal to the one assuming a Gaussian attack, which is not the case for the proof based on the uncertainty principle. This is crucial for the distribution of keys over long distances [11] .
To prove this result, we develop a number of techniques including a tool for reliable tomography of the covariance matrix without making any assumption about the quantum state. By performing the Parameter Estimation (PE) step after Error Correction (EC), we improve the estimation and are able to use almost all the raw data to distill the secret key. Our only assumptions are that Alice and Bob have access to a classical authenticated channel and that their equipment is trusted: they can prepare coherent states and detect light with heterodyne detection. Our framework can easily incorporate imperfections either in the preparation or in the detection, as long as they are properly modeled. To keep the notations simple, we will however assume that the equipment of the legitimate parties is perfect.
Composable security.-An Entanglement-Based (EB) QKD protocol E is a Completely-Positive TracePreserving (CPTP) map E : H A ⊗ H B → S A ⊗ S B ⊗ C that takes an arbitrary input state ρ AB shared by Alice and Bob and outputs for each party a classical string S A or S B , and some public transcript C. For a CV protocol, both H A and H B correspond to infinite-dimensional Fock spaces, while S A , S B and C describe classical registers.
A QKD protocol should be secure, meaning that the output keys should be identical and secret [7] . It should also be robust, i.e. output nontrivial keys if there is no ac-tive attack on the quantum channel. These are actually properties of the output state of the protocol, more precisely of ρ SASB E , which should hold for any input state [42] . The subscript E refers to the quantum register H E of the adversary, and the final state is obtained by applying the map E ⊗ id HE to the an arbitrary purification Ψ ABE of ρ AB . A QKD protocol is called correct if S A = S B for any strategy of the adversary, that is, any initial state of the protocol Ψ ABE . A protocol is ǫ corcorrect if Pr[S A = S B ] ≤ ǫ cor . Denote by H E ′ = H E ⊗ C the space accessible to the adversary (her quantum system E and the public transcript C). A key is called ∆-secret if it is ∆-close to a uniformly distributed key that is uncorrelated with the eavesdropper:
where ρ l SAE ′ is the state conditioned on the key length l and ω l is the fully mixed state on classical strings of length l. If the protocol aborts, it outputs a dummy key of size 0, which is automatically secret. A QKD protocol is called ǫ sec -secret if for any attack strategy, it outputs ∆-secret keys with (1 − p abort )∆ ≤ ǫ sec , where p abort is the abort probability. A QKD protocol is ǫ-secure if it is ǫ sec -secret and ǫ cor -correct with ǫ sec + ǫ cor ≤ ǫ. Since a protocol that would always abort is perfectly secure according to this definition, it is important to take into account its robustness ǫ rob , which is the probability that the protocol aborts if the eavesdropper is inactive. In the case of a CV QKD protocol, the quantum channel is then a thermal bosonic channel, which is a good model for the transmission of light in an optical fiber.
Description of the CV QKD protocol E 0 .-We focus here on the EB version of the protocol, but the security of its Prepare and Measure (PM) version where Alice sends coherent states and Bob uses heterodyne detection follows immediately. Moreover, we present the reverse reconciliation version, which is the most useful in practice. The direct reconciliation version is easily obtained by interchanging the roles of Alice and Bob in the classical post-processing part of the protocol. Recall that in order to obtain security against general attacks, one would need to add another step to the protocol, involving an energy test as well as a potential symmetrization procedure.
The protocol E 0 is sketched in Fig. 1 (and detailed in the appendix) and depends on a number of parameters: most notably, the number 2n of coherent states sent by Alice, the length l of the final key if the protocol did not abort, the discretization parameter d, the size of Bob's communication to Alice, leak EC , during the error correction procedure, the maximum failure probabilities ǫ cor and ǫ PE for the EC and PE steps, respectively, some bounds on covariance matrix elements, Σ for the PE test to pass and a robustness parameter ǫ rob .
Our main result quantifies the security of the protocol E 0 in the composable security framework. Theorem 1. The protocol E 0 is ǫ-secure against collective attacks if ǫ = 2ǫ sm +ǭ + ǫ PE + ǫ ent and 
otherwise the protocol aborts.
Privacy Amplification:
Alice and Bob apply a random universal2 hash function to their respective strings, obtaining two strings SA and SB of size l. This secret key size should be compared to the asymptotic secret key rate assuming collective, Gaussian attacks. This can be done by assuming a passive quantum channel corresponding to a Gaussian channel with transmittance T and excess noise ξ. One needs to factor in the robustness of the protocol, that is the probability that the PE test will not pass in the case of a passive channel. We plot the secret key rate as a function of n for ǫ = 10 2n, number of exchanged signals r, expected secret key rate Figure 2 : Expected secret key rate r = (1 − ǫ rob )l/2n secure against collective attacks, as a function of 2n, the number of exchanged signals. From top to bottom, the transmittance of the quantum channel corresponds to distances of 1 km, 10 km, 50 km and 100 km for assumed losses of 0.02 dB per km. For each distance, the expected secret key rate reaches the asymptotic value for large enough n. The modulation variance is optimized, the reconciliation efficiency is set to β = 0.9, the discretization parameter to d = 5, the excess noise to ξ = 0.01, the robustness parameter to ǫ rob ≤ 10 on Fig. 2 . The asymptotic key rate is typically reached for n between 10 8 and 10 10 for distances up to 50 km.
Parameter Estimation.-We defer the detailed description of the protocol E 0 and its full security proof to the appendix and focus more specifically on the PE step here. A novelty of the protocol is that PE is performed after EC. This can be done quite efficiently since a rough estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the data is in general sufficient to choose an appropriate error correcting code and proceed with the reconciliation. At the end of the EC step, Alice therefore knows the strings X and U and it is not hard to show that if Bob sends her a few additional bits, she can learn the values of X 2 , Y 2 and X, Y arbitrarily well.
The goal of the PE step is to obtain a confidence region for the covariance matrix of the state ρ 2n AB . Here, one needs to be careful because by the time PE is performed, the state has already been measured and it does not make really sense to talk about its covariance matrix anymore. We will follow the paradigm for tomography introduced in Ref. [24] and define a quantum tomography process as a CPTP map that takes an input state ρ n+k ∈ H ⊗(n+k) , symmetrizes it and outputs a state ρ n ∈ H ⊗n as well as a confidence region R of P = (H ⊗n ), the set of normalized density operators on H ⊗n [43] . In words, it consists in measuring a subsystem of the initial state and making a prediction for the remaining state. The quality of the quantum tomography is assessed by two parameters: the probability that the prediction is false and the size of the region. A larger region means a smaller error probability, but also a more pessimistic secret key rate.
An important issue concerning the tomography of a CV system is that the covariance matrix is a priori unbounded. Consider for instance the state σ ⊗(n+k) with σ = (1 − ǫ)|0 0| + ǫ|N N |. The covariance matrix of σ is diag(1 + N ǫ/2, 1 + N ǫ/2) but any tomographic procedure that only examines k ≪ 1/ǫ modes will conclude that the covariance matrix is close to that of the vacuum, which is clearly incorrect if N ǫ ≫ 1. The solution to this problem consists in first appropriately symmetrizing the state ρ n+k before measuring k subsystems and inferring properties for the remaining n modes.
Ideally, the tomography of the input state ρ 
th mode of Alice for instance. An interesting feature of this PE procedure is that A 1 and A 2 can respectively estimate the covariance matrices ofρ n 2 andρ n 1 , meaning that a secret key can be distilled from both halves of the state. In other words, no raw key is wasted because of parameter estimation. While it is clear that this scheme is rather impractical, one can show that it can nevertheless be efficiently simulated by Alice, without any need for symmetrization or for additional parties.
In fact, if Alice learns the values of X 2 , Y 2 and X, Y , she can compute γ a , γ b , γ c as follows
We are now in a position to define the Parameter Estimation Test and bound its failure probability (proven in the appendix).
Theorem 2. The probability that the Parameter Estimation Test passes, that is, 
Here the Holevo information
where ν 1 and ν 2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
Once we are able to analyze the PE test, the rest of the security proof follows in a rather straightforward fashion: see Appendix for all the details. It should be noted that the assumption of collective attacks was not used in the PE step: this is because the symmetrization breaks the tensor product of the state. However, we crucially rely on the collective attack assumption when exploiting the Asymptotic Equipartition Property of the smooth minentropy, which is the quantity of interest to analyze the success of the privacy amplification step.
A security proof against general attacks.-So far, we have restricted the analysis to collective attacks. For CV QKD, there are two known techniques to obtain a full security proof from one holding against collective attacks: an exponential version of de Finetti theorem [16] and the Postselection technique [17] . The former technique directly applies here and can be used to upgrade the protocol E 0 to a slightly more complicated one (including an energy test and a random permutation) that is provablyǫ-secure against general attacks, but withǫ ≫ ǫ, provided the key length is adequately shortened. However, while this provides composable security CV QKD with coherent states against general attacks, it does not give very good finite-key estimates. The Postselection technique is better, but still falls short on providing useful finite-size key estimates. Indeed, in order to apply it, one needs to add an energy test which depends on a small parameter ǫ test , and if the protocol E 0 was ǫ-secure against collective attacks, the new protocol isǫ-secure against general attacks whereǫ = ǫ2 O(log 4 (n/ǫtest)) +2ǫ test , which is prohibitive in practice. Moreover, in the case of reverse reconciliation, it seems that the current Postselection technique requires an additional symmetrization step for the classical data, which has complexity Θ(n 2 ). Whether or not this symmetrization can be simulated, as was the case in the PE step, is left as an interesting open question.
Conclusion.-We have provided a composable security proof of a CV QKD protocol using coherent states valid against collective attacks. This was the missing step to establish the security of such protocols against general attacks in the composable security framework. The bounds we obtained seem to be tight and are compatible with state-of-the-art experiments. For protocols with direct reconciliation, this directly gives a composable security proof against general attacks. For reverse reconciliation, which is required to achieve long distances, an additional symmetrization step provides the same level of security. Further work will be needed to improve the current reductions from general to collective attacks, which should be possible since current techniques to not exploit all the symmetries of the protocols.
In this appendix, we first recall the basic definitions related to the composable security of QKD (Section A). Then, in Section B, we give a complete description of the QKD protocol E 0 that is secure against collective attacks. In Section C, we introduce the tools needed for the security proof. In Section D, we explain the ideas behind the Parameter Estimation procedure and establish an upper bound for the failure probability of the PE test. We present the security proof in Section E. Finally, in Section F, we explain how to upgrade E 0 to a protocol provably secure against general attacks.
Appendix A: Quantum Key Distribution and Composable Security
A Entanglement-Based (EB) QKD protocol E is a Completely-Positive Trace-Preserving (CPTP) map:
Let us explain the notations. The Hilbert spaces H A and H B refer to the state spaces of Alice and Bob, respectively. Typically, each of these spaces corresponds to a large number of copies of a small Hilbert space. For instance, in the case of the BB84 protocol, one has
⊗n , where n is a large number counting how many 2-qubit states are shared by Alice and Bob. For a Hilbert space H, we denote by P(H) the set of positive semi-definite operators on H and by P = (H) the set of operators in P(H) with unit trace. Technically, the QKD protocol is therefore defined for the space P = (H A ⊗ H B ), but it is sufficient to define it for H A ⊗ H B and to extend it by linearity. In the case of a continuous-variable protocol, H corresponds to an n-mode Fock space: H ∼ = F ⊗n where F = Span(|0 , . . . , |k , . . .) and |k is a k-photon Fock state. The fact that this space is infinite-dimensional makes the analysis much more involved than for BB84, already for the case of collective attacks where the relevant space is F ⊗ F in a CV protocol (i.e. it is sufficient to consider a single copy of the state and H A ⊗ H B is simply F ⊗ F ), compared to the 2-qubit space 2 ⊗ 2 for BB84. The spaces S A , S B , T A , T B , C correspond to classical registers (with subscripts A and B referring to Alice and Bob, respectively). Indeed a QKD protocol takes a quantum state as its input and outputs classical strings. (An exception is device-independent QKD where the inputs are also classical but then, the violation of a Bell inequality ensures that Alice and Bob are indeed measuring an entangled quantum system.) The spaces S are that of the final keys, the spaces T correspond to the private transcripts and C is the public transcript of the protocol, corresponding to the classical information exchanged on the authenticated classical channel and therefore accessible by Eve. For instance, the register C contains the size l of the final key, which can be zero if the protocol aborted. Usually, the registers T A and T B are omitted in the description of a protocol, but we mention them for completeness.
A QKD protocol should be secure, which means that it should display both properties of secrecy and correctness. It should also be robust in the sense that it should output nontrivial keys if there is no active attack on the quantum channel. Here, we follow the definitions of Ref. [7] . These properties correspond to properties of the output state, more precisely of ρ SASBE , which should hold for any input state. (Here, and in the remainder of the text, ρ H corresponds to the marginal of the state ρ restricted to subspace H.) We note the appearance of the register E corresponding to the Hilbert space H E of the adversary. To formalize it, we imagine that the true input space of the protocol is H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H E , and that the input state is a pure state (this is without loss of generality). The protocol then acts as E AB ⊗ id E , i.e. it acts trivially on the adversary' s space. The output space is S A ⊗ S B ⊗ T A ⊗ T B ⊗ C ⊗ H E . Denote by H E ′ = C ⊗ H E the space accessible to the adversary (corresponding to her own quantum system E and to the totality of public communication C). We will be interested in the state ρ SASB E ′ describing the (output) joint state of the keys of Alice and Bob and of the adversary. More precisely, a QKD protocol is called correct if S A = S B for any strategy of the adversary, that is, any initial state of the protocol Ψ ABE . A protocol is ǫ cor -correct if Pr[S A = S B ] ≤ ǫ cor . A key is called ∆-secret if it is ∆-close to a uniformly distributed key that is uncorrelated with the eavesdropper:
where ρ l SA is the state conditioned on the key length being l and ω l is the fully mixed state on classical strings of length l. We immediately note that if the protocol aborts, the corresponding key, is automatically secret since one party aborting the protocol immediately informs the other party about this decision. A QKD protocol is called ǫ sec -secret if it outputs ∆-secret keys with (1 − p abort )∆ ≤ ǫ sec . Here, p abort represents the probability that the protocol aborts. This probability depends on the strategy of the adversary, that is on the input state Ψ ABE . Indeed, the adversary can always choose to cut the line between Alice and Bob and hence make sure that the protocol always aborts. This is fine since the key will nevertheless be secure. An important parameter is the robustness, ǫ rob , of the protocol, which corresponds to the abort probability if the adversary is passive, and if the characteristics of the quantum channel are conform to what was expected. For instance, in the case of a CV QKD protocol, a typical quantum channel corresponding to an optical fiber will be a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance T and excess noise ξ. A QKD protocol is ǫ-secure if it is ǫ sec -secret and ǫ cor -correct with ǫ sec + ǫ cor ≤ ǫ.
A generic technique to prove that a protocol is ǫ-secure is to show that it is indistinguishable from an ideal protocol. Here, indistinguishability refers to two CPTP maps, and is quantified by the diamond distance between these maps, with the operational property that the maximum probability of correctly guessing whether a map corresponds to E or F is given by p = 1 2 + 1 4 E − F ⋄ . Here the map E will be the QKD protocol and F should be an ideal version of the same QKD protocol. This ideal version is for instance obtained by concatenating E and a (virtual) protocol P that replaces the final keys S A and S B by a perfect key S: P(ρ l SASB E ′ ) = ω l,l ⊗ ρ E ′ , where ω l,l is the totally mixed state on two copies of strings of length l. One defines F = P • E and the protocol E is ǫ-secure if
We note that for (finite-dimensional) symmetric protocols, i.e. such that E •π = E for any operation π that permutes simultaneously Alice's and Bob's n quantum subsystems, this diamond distance can be bounded by computing the distance when applied to an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state. This is the idea behind the Postselection technique [6] , which shows that for such protocols, collective attacks are asymptotically optimal. A crucial question, however, is that of verifying that a protocol displays the required symmetry. This is the case for protocols such as BB84 with strict one-way classical communication (in fact, the protocol is first restricted to one where Alice prepares the initial entangled state, which cannot be given by the adversary), but in general, it might be necessary to actively symmetrize the state (or at least the raw keys) in order to make the protocol symmetric. We will come back to this question later since symmetrization is a costly process that one would like to avoid in a practical implementation.
All these notions extend to Prepare-and-Measure (PM) protocols in the following way. A PM protocol and an EB protocol are equivalent if they are indistinguishable from any coalition of observers outside of Alice's lab, and if Alice outputs the same key in both cases. The security of a given PM protocol is a consequence of the security of the equivalent EB protocol.
Note finally that in this paper, we make the assumption that the measurement devices of Alice and Bob are trusted and behave accordingly to their theoretical model. In the protocol we consider, the measurements correspond to heterodyne detection. For a single-mode state ρ, the probability density function of measurement outcome is p(α) = α|ρ|α where |α = e
|k is a coherent state centered on α ∈ in phase-space. In particular, these assumptions imply that Eve cannot tamper with the Local Oscillator used for the detection. To avoid too much complication, we also assume that Alice's state preparation and Bob's detection are ideal, but note that incorporating (trusted) imperfections to these models (for instance, imperfect quantum detection efficiency) is straightforward using similar techniques as in Ref. [26] for instance. Moreover, we use the convention that the shot-noise is equal to 1.
Appendix B: Description of the CV QKD protocol
The main part of this manuscript is devoted to the analysis of a specific protocol, denoted by E 0 , for which we prove composable security against collective attacks. We focus on the EB version of the protocol here, with reverse reconciliation. The direct reconciliation version is easily derived by interchanging the roles of Alice and Bob in the classical post-processing part of the protocol. In order to obtain security against general attacks, one needs to add another step to the protocol, involving an energy test as well as a potential symmetrization procedure. This will be described in Section F.
The protocol is characterized by a number of parameters:
• the number 2n of light pulses (coherent states) exchanged during the protocol.
• The size l of the final key if the protocol did not abort.
• The number d of bits on which each measurement result is encoded. For numerical application, we will use d = 5.
• The size of Bob's communication to Alice, leak EC , during the error correction procedure: this includes the syndrome of Bob's string for an error correcting code that was decided in advance by Alice and Bob, as well as the size of a small hash that will allow them to check that the error correction succeeded, except with some small probability ǫ cor . Here failure means that the keys of Alice and Bob do not coincide and that the protocol did not abort.
• The number of bits n PE that Bob sends to Alice during the Parameter Estimation.
• Some bounds on covariance matrix elements,
The role of the Parameter Estimation procedure is to make sure that these bounds are sound in the realization of the protocol. Typically, these values are optimized as a function of the expected characteristics (transmittance and excess noise) of the quantum channel.
• A maximum failure probability of the Parameter Estimation procedure, ǫ PE .
A sketch of the protocol E 0 is displayed on Fig. 3. We also recall our main result:
State Preparation
The protocol E 0 is ǫ-secure against collective attacks if ǫ = 2ǫ sm +ǭ + ǫ PE + ǫ ent for ǫ sm ,ǭ, ǫ PE , ǫ ent > 0 and
whereĤ MLE (U ) is the empiric entropy of U , ∆ ent := 8n log 2 (4n) log(2/ǫ ent ), ∆ AEP := 4 log(2 d/2 + 2) × 4n log 2 2/ǫ 2 sm and f is the function computing the Holevo information between Eve and Bob's measurement result for a Gaussian state with covariance matrix parametrized by Σ We now detail the various steps of the protocol.
Alice prepares 2n copies of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, |Φ ⊗2n where |Φ =
|k, k . The squeezing parameter of the state is optimized as a function of the expected characteristics of the quantum channel. The covariance matrix of the two-mode squeezed vacuum state (with the ordering conventionq A ,p A ,q B ,p B wherê q A/B andp A/B are the quadrature operators for Alice and Bob, respectively) is given by
where ½ 2 = diag(1, 1) and σ z = diag(1, −1). Alice keeps the first mode of each state |Φ and sends the second half to Bob through an insecure quantum channel. When proving security, we will not make any assumption about the quantum channel, which can be arbitrary. When considering the robustness of the protocol, however, it makes sense to model the channel as one that typically occurs in implementations. Our model of choice is a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance T and excess noise ξ. In this specific case, the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is Gaussian and its covariance matrix reads:
2. Measurement
a. Obtaining two real-valued vectors
In the Entanglement-Based version of the protocol, the measurement phase is straightforward. Alice and Bob both have access to 2n modes, which they measure with a heterodyne detection. We denote byq andp the two quadratures for each mode. Alice and Bob then form two vectors of length 4n where odd index coordinates refer to quadrature measurementq and even index coordinates refer to quadraturep. We denote these two vectors by X exp = (X 
Here V corresponds to the variance of the initial two-mode squeezed vacuum states prepared by Alice.
The equivalence between the Entangled-Based and the Prepare-and-Measure versions of the protocol is seen from the fact that Alice's vectors in both cases are related through Eq. B4. We recall that in the Prepare-and-Measure version, Alice would simply prepare the 2n coherent states {|X 
b. Centering the measurement outcomes
In the QKD protocols investigated in this paper, Alice and Bob will measure a quantum state with a heterodyne detection and obtain continuous-valued outcomes X (where the components with an odd index correspond to measurement outcomes for theq quadrature and components with an even index correspond top quadrature measurements), and where the superscript exp refers to the fact that the variables correspond to the effectively measured experimental data.
The security of the key that can be extracted from a given state with the protocols described here does not depend on the first moment of the quantum state: only its covariance matrix matters [19, 20] . For that reason, Alice and Bob can apply a displacement to their state before measuring it or alternatively simulate this displacement at the level of classical data. For reasons that will appear more clearly later (related to the symmetrization procedure needed for Parameter Estimation for instance), it is better for the quantum state to be centered. To do that, Alice and Bob can compute two values for the displacement: 
and use these variables in the remainder of the QKD protocol. The resulting random variables X k and Y k and therefore centered. One advantage of working with centered variables is that the covariance matrix elements can be simply expressed in terms of X 2 , Y 2 and X, Y .
c. Discretization of a continuous variable
In this work, we only consider discretization of continuous variables, one at a time. More precisely, we will divide the real axis into 2 d intervals. Here, the choice of a power of 2 is only made for convenience. This partition should be chosen so as to maximize the secret key rate in the case where the adversary is passive, when the quantum channel acts as a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance and excess noise. In that case, Bob's outcomes are centered Gaussian random variables. Bob can easily compute the average variance of his measurement outcomes,
. We will apply the discretization map D : Y → U that assigns a distinct value for each quantile:
We note that if the quantum channel is indeed Gaussian, then the random variable U = D(Y ) should be close to uniform, i.e. have almost maximum entropy. In fact, this discretization is suboptimal because it does not maximize the mutual information between Alice and Bob, I(X; U ). This will lead to a slightly suboptimal secret key rate, but with the advantage of a simpler security analysis. Better schemes involving a multidimensional error correction have been investigated in the literature [27] and could probably be proven secure against general attacks.
At the end of this step, Alice knows the vector X ∈ Ê 4n and Bob knows both vectors Y ∈ Ê 4n and U ∈ {1, . . . , 2 d } 4n .
Error correction
The goal of this step is for Alice to learn the string U . In order to help her calibrate her data, Bob first sends her the value of Y 2 which is used for the discretization function D. This can be done by sending the value of Y 2 /(4n) with a few bits of precision. A possible technique to perform error correction is called slice reconciliation [28, 29] . This means that Alice and Bob agree (before they start the QKD protocol) on a linear error correcting code C (or, more precisely, on a family of such codes) that encodes K-bit binary strings into 4dn-bit code words. This code is described by a parity-check matrix H of size (4dn) × (4dn − K). Bob computes the syndrome HU of his vector (interpreted as a binary string of length 4dn) and sends this syndrome to Alice. This syndrome accounts for most of the leakage during the error correction procedure. A figure of merit typically used in CV QKD to assess the quality of the error correction is the reconciliation efficiency β defined as:
where the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is that of the expected Gaussian channel mapping X to Y . The reconciliation efficiency compares how much information was extracted through the error correction procedure and compares it with the available mutual information corresponding to a Gaussian quantum channel of transmittance T and excess noise ξ. In particular, one expects:
In that case, the quantity 1 2 log 2 (1 + SNR) is the mutual information for each use of the channel, and gives an upper bound on the quantity of (classical) information that can be transmitted over the classical channel X i → Y i . The reconciliation efficiency therefore quantifies how far the error correction procedure is from an ideal one: if β = 1, then it is perfect. In practice, one can typically achieve β ≈ 0.9 for a Gaussian channel [29] .
Once Alice learns the syndrome HU , she can use it together with her vector X and the value of Y in order to recover an estimateÛ of U . This is done by decoding the code C in the coset corresponding to the syndrome. There are very practical algorithms for decoding as soon as the code C is a low-density parity-check code for instance.
After this step, it is necessary to know whether the error correction worked, i.e. whetherÛ = U or not. To achieve this, the usual technique is for Alice and Bob to choose a random universal 2 hash function mapping 4dn-bit strings to strings of length ⌈log(1/ǫ cor )⌉. Then Bob reveals his hash to Alice. If both hashes coincide, the protocol resumes, otherwise it aborts. The length of the hash is chosen so the protocol is ǫ cor -correct (see Theorem 1 of Ref. [7] for a proof of this statement).
Parameter Estimation
The Parameter Estimation is arguably the most crucial step in a QKD protocol: it is a coarse-grained version of quantum tomography, the process of inferring the description of a quantum state when one only has access to measurement outcomes. It is only a coarse-grained version of tomography because the security of the key usually only depends on a small number of parameters of the underlying quantum state.
Before we describe in detail the Parameter Estimation step of the protocol E 0 , it is useful to explain a bit more how one can perform the tomography of continuous-variable quantum systems. Our approach is based on the paradigm introduced by Christandl and Renner in Ref. [24] .
a. Estimation of the covariance matrix of a CV system
One specific aspect of quantum tomography is that it does not make sense to speak of a quantum state if the state does not exist anymore, because it was already measured, say. For this reason, a quantum tomography process can be described as a CPTP map as follows:
where R is a classical random variable corresponding to a confidence region for the output state ρ n . More precisely, the random variable R describes a region of P = (H ⊗n ), the set of normalized density operators on H ⊗n , which is believed to contain the state ρ n . Here the superscript n for ρ n should not be interpreted as saying that the state has an i.i.d. structure, nor that ρ n corresponds to a marginal state of ρ n+k ; it is merely a reminder of the size of Hilbert space it lives in.
The quantum tomography protocol involves performing measurements on a subsystem (here living in H k ) of the initial quantum state and the quality of the protocol is assessed by two parameters: the probability ǫ tom that the prediction is false and the size of the region. Of course, if the region R is equal to the total space, H ⊗n , the prediction is always correct, but it is also uninformative. For a QKD protocol, the size of the region will influence the tightness of the bound on the secret key rate: smaller confidence regions lead to tighter key rates. But the more crucial parameter is the probability that the prediction is incorrect. This probability is the smallest value of ǫ tom such that:
where ρ n and R are the output of the map Tom applied to ρ n+k . In the context of CV QKD, we are interested in estimating the (averaged) covariance matrix of a bipartite stateρ n AB (this state is in fact obtained from ρ 2n AB after a suitable symmetrization as we will explain later) which is characterized by three real values:
where q A,i is the quadrature operator
for the i th mode of Alice for instance. For CV QKD, the region R will be a confidence region for the three parameters Σ a , Σ b and Σ c . There are two reasons for this choice. The first one is the extremality property of Gaussian states for the Holevo information [18, 19] : this says that this information can be upper bounded by a function of the covariance matrix of the state. Second, it is sufficient to compute this bound for the following symmetrized covariance matrix:
where the entries * are not specified. More precisely, one can always assume that these entries are 0. This will be detailed in the section devoted to the security proof. Moreover, because of the properties of the Holevo information, it will be sufficient for our purpose to obtain a confidence region for
Usually n+k) . When it comes to estimating a covariance matrix, however, this assumption still appears quite weak. The problem comes from the fact that the coefficients of the covariance matrix are a priori unbounded (this is an fundamental difference with finite-dimensional systems such as qubits, for which the density matrix elements are obviously bounded). Consider for instance the state σ ⊗(n+k) with σ = (1 − ǫ)|0 0| + ǫ|N N |. The covariance matrix of σ is diag(1 + N ǫ/2, 1 + N ǫ/2) but any tomographic procedure that only examines k ≪ 1/ǫ modes will conclude that the covariance matrix is close to that of the vacuum, which is clearly false if N ǫ ≫ 1. In order to solve this issue, the solution consists in first appropriately symmetrizing the state ρ n+k before measuring k subsystems and inferring properties for the remaining n modes. This will solve the problem of parameter estimation, but create a new issue, namely that the output state of the tomographic procedure will not have a i.i.d. structure anymore, making the analysis of collective attacks more complicated.
The symmetrization that makes sense for CV QKD is the one that maximally symmetrizes the state while leaving the (averaged) values Σ a , Σ b , Σ c of the covariance matrix unchanged. We explain this symmetrization now for an initial state ρ n+k on F
. Consider the unitary group U (n + k) acting on n+k . This group acts in a natural way on the (n + k)-mode Fock space F ⊗(n+k) by associating to V ∈ U (n + k) the unitary operator Φ(V ) acting on F ⊗(n+k) which maps the vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n+k ) of annihilation operators of the n + k modes to the vector V a. This operation corresponds to a passive linear symplectic map in phase space and can be implemented thanks to a network of beamsplitters and phase-shifts acting on the n + k modes. The group U (n + k) also acts naturally on F
by associating to V the unitary Φ(V ) A ⊗ Φ(V * ) B where V * represents the complex conjugate of V . The symmetrization procedure consists in drawing a random unitary V from the Haar measure dV on U (n + k) and applying Φ(V ) A ⊗ Φ(V * ) B to the state:
The Parameter Estimation procedure that we have in mind first symmetrizes the state with Sym, then measures the last k modes with heterodyne detection and uses the measurement outcomes to give a confidence region for Σ a , Σ b , Σ c . In the QKD protocol, we will in fact choose k = n. If Alice and Bob were to proceed with the tomography procedure explained above, they would therefore measure n modes each with heterodyne detection, and attempt to infer a confidence region for the covariance matrix of the n remaining modes. Let us denote by X 2 and Y 2 the 2n-vectors corresponding to their measurement results. In order to estimate Σ a , Σ b , Σ c , Alice and Bob need to compute X 2 2 , Y 2 2 and X 2 , Y 2 . Since we study a QKD protocol, it is essential to limit classical communication to a minimum, because it might help the adversary. Our goal is for Alice to be able to perform the parameter estimation: it is clear that she can compute X 2 2 . Similarly, Bob can compute Y 2 2 locally and simply send the result to Alice using a few bits to encode its value (as we explained before). Computing the inner product X 2 , Y 2 is a bit more problematic. In fact, computing the inner product of two vectors held by distant parties is a very well-known problem in communication complexity where the goal is to achieve the task while exchanging as little public information as possible. In the QKD setting, we are helped because the parameter estimation can be performed after the error correction. This means in particular that Alice knows X 2 as well asŶ 2 , her estimate of Y 2 . Recall that this is only an estimate because the error correction procedure only allows her to recover Bob's discretized vector (with high probability if the protocol did not abort).
Our goal is to obtain a lower bound on the value of X 2 , Y 2 , which will translate into a lower bound for Σ c . The discretization procedure maps Y to U . We define another map that attempts to invert the discretization. Recall that I i is the i th quantile of the distribution N (0, v) for a specific variance v. One can define 2 d values, one for each quantile, as follows:
which means thatŷ i corresponds to the mean of the Gaussian random variable conditioned on the fact that it is in the quantile I i . Alice knows both X 2 andŶ 2 while Bob knows Y 2 andŶ 2 . Since X 2 , Y 2 = X 2 ,Ŷ 2 + X 2 , Y 2 −Ŷ 2 , it is sufficient for Alice to be able to estimate X 2 , Y 2 −Ŷ 2 , a quantity expected to be very small in practice. In order to achieve this, Bob first sends the norm of Y 2 −Ŷ 2 to Alice. This requires only a small constant number of bits. Then, the communication problem that Alice and Bob should solve is the following: Alice knows a 2n-dimensional unit vector a = , and they wish to estimate a, b up to a small additive error.
adversary's system. Then, when the analysis is restricted to collective attacks, the Asymptotic Equipartition Property allows one to compute this smooth min-entropy as a function of the von Neumann entropy of a single subsystem. There are two problems remaining then: computing the entropy of the string U and estimating the average covariance matrix of the quantum system. The first question is addressed thanks to a concentration result for the entropy of an i.i.d. random variable, the second is taken care of with the analysis of the parameter estimation test.
Leftover Hash Lemma
One wishes to prove a statement about the secrecy of a given QKD protocol, i.e. that
In other words, the variable S A should be decoupled from the system E ′ characterizing what is available to the adversary, namely her own Hilbert space H E as well as the public information, C, leaked during the QKD protocol. Such a bound can be established via the Leftover Hash Lemma [33, 34] , which holds if S A is obtained by applying a random universal 2 hash function of length l to the string U , where l should be slightly smaller than the smooth min-entropy of U conditioned on E ′ . The smooth min-entropy, H ǫ min (U |E), introduced in Ref. [33] , characterizes the average probability that Eve guesses U correctly using her optimal strategy with access to the correlations stored in her quantum memory [35] . For a precise mathematical definition, we refer the reader to Ref. [36] .
More precisely, the Privacy Amplification procedure applied to the string U outputs a the key of size l which is ǫ sec -secret provided that [7, 34, 37] ǫ sec = min
where E ′ summarizes all the information Eve learned about U during the protocol.
The Asymptotic Equipartition Property
In Ref. [36] , the authors establish the following result, known as the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) and which relates the smooth min-entropy of a conditional i.i.d. distribution to the von Neumann entropy of the conditional distribution, the latter quantity being much easier to compute in practice.
Theorem 4 (Asymptotic Equipartition Property [36] ). Let ρ AE ∈ S(H AE ), ǫ > 0, η = Υ(A|E) ρ|ρ and n ∈ AE, such that ρ ⊗n AE is an i.i.d. state on H ⊗n AE , then
where, for n ≥ 
and
If the system A is a classical random variable U with a support of size
We obtain the following formulation of the AEP:
3. Lower bound on the entropy of an i.i.d. variable
Let U be an random variable with finite support {u 1 , . . . , u 2 d } described by an unknown probability distribution p i = Pr[U = u i ]. Given that we observe n independent realizations of this random variable, U = (U 1 , . . . , U n ), we wish to obtain a lower bound on its entropy
wherep i = 1 n n k=1 δ i (U k ) and δ i denotes the probability measure concentrated at u i . The random variableĤ MLE (U ) is negatively biased everywhere [38] :
where p denotes the conditional expectation given p. This gives a lower bound on H(U ) but one that is not directly observable in an experiment. The missing piece is a concentration result forĤ MLE (U ) around its mean due to Antos and Kontoyiannis [39] .
Theorem 5 (Antos and Kontoyiannis).
SinceĤ MLE (U ) is directly measurable in an experiment, we obtain a lower bound on the entropy of the distribution, when we are given access to n i.i.d. realizations:
Gaussian states and covariance matrices
Using the AEP, the problem of computing the smooth min-entropy above can actually be reduced to the problem of computing the Holevo information χ(Y ; E) between Bob's measurement outcome Y and the register E. Thanks to extremality properties of Gaussian states [18, 19] , it is known that this quantity can be upper bounded by its value computed for a Gaussian state with the same covariance matrix as the true state. We will now proceed and show that it is in fact sufficient to know a symmetrized covariance matrix in order to get a bound on Eve's information.
We need to analyze the symmetrization of the covariance matrix and show that without loss of security, one can assume that it only depends on 3 variables. A general 2-mode covariance matrix with the appropriate symmetry (that is, where the state has been symmetrized with the map Sym described in Eq. B16) is of the form:
One can check that the determinant D of γ and the quantity ∆ = x 2 + y 2 − 2z 2 (corresponding to the sum of the determinants of the four 2 × 2 blocks of γ) are independent of θ. This means that the symplectic eigenvalues of γ are independent of θ. This was expected since θ corresponds to a phase-shift applied to Alice's mode for instance.
The conditional 2 × 2 covariance matrix of Alice's state given that Bob performed a heterodyne detection on his part of the state is
(C12) 
† . This can be achieved by processing the optical modes through the appropriate network of beamsplitters and phase-shifts.
3. Distribution to additional players: Alice forwards her first n modes to Agent A1 and the remaining n modes to Agent A2. Similarly, Bob forwards his first n modes to B1 and the remaining n modes to B2. The first n modes correspond to a bipartite state ρ1, the remaining modes to a state ρ2.
4.
Measurement: Agents A1 and B1 measure their n respective modes with a heterodyne detection obtaining two vectors X1 and Y1 of length 2n. Similarly, A2 and B2 measure their modes with heterodyne detection, obtain vectors X2 and Y2. Finally, agents B1 and B2 publicly reveal Y1 and Y2.
5.
Parameter Estimation: Agent A1 uses X1 and Y1 to compute a confidence region for the (averaged) covariance matrix of ρ2. Similarly, A2 computes a confidence region for that of ρ1. 
Proofs related to the analysis of Parameter Estimation
The first lemma is a standard concentration measure result in statistics.
Lemma 6 (Tail bounds for χ 2 distribution [40] ). Let U be a χ 2 statistics with n degrees of freedom. For any x > 0,
and Pr U − X ≥ 2
The following two lemmas deal with the situation where Alice tries to simulate the distribution of ρ 1 to A 1 and B 2 and ρ 2 to A 2 and B 2 . In particular, given the knowledge of X 2 , Y 2 and X, Y , she can compute confidence regions for X i 2 , Y i 2 and X i , Y i . Since the symmetrization of the state with the map Sym described B16 commutes with the heterodyne measurement, Alice can simulate the measurement of A 1 by first measuring X and only later perform the random rotation. In particular, the random vector X 1 corresponds to the projection of X on a random subspace of complex dimension n.
Lemma 7. Given a vector X ∈ 2n , consider X 1 the projection of X on a random subspace of dimension n, then for x ≤ n/2, Pr 2 X 1 2 ≥ 1 + 1.5 x n X 2 ≤ 2e −x (D2)
Proof. By rotation invariance of the problem in 2n , one can fix the random subspace to be Span(|1 , . . . , |n ) where (|1 , . . . , |2n ) is the canonical basis of 2n and take the vector |X to be uniformly distributed on the sphere of radius X in 2n . We wish to get bounds on the random variable X|Π|X where Π = n i=1 |i i|. Writing |X = 2n i=1 α i |i , one obtains
where x i and y i are i.i.d. normal variables N (0, 1) and the last equality follows from the well-known fact that one can generate a uniformly distributed vector on a sphere by drawing i.i.d. normal variables for its coordinates and normalizing the resulting vector. In particular, X|Π|X has the same distribution as U U+U ′ where U and U ′ are independent χ 2 random variables. Using the bounds of Lemma 6 together with the union bound, one obtains Pr U ≥ n + 2 √ nx + 2x ≤ e −x and Pr U ≤ n − 2 √ nx ≤ e −x , Pr U U + U ′ ≥ n + 2 √ nx + 2x 2(n + x) ≤ 2e −x and Pr U U + U ′ ≤ n − 2 √ nx 2(n + x) ≤ 2e
−x
Proof. The first two inequalities are a direct application of Lemma B.1 in Ref. [17] and of the observation that for γ ∈ [0, 0.05], the following inequality holds:
Similarly, one can show that the following inequalities also hold:
Pr X 2 2 ≤ 1 − 4 log(2/ǫ) 2n
Pr Y 2 2 ≤ 1 − 4 log(2/ǫ) 2n
Using the same strategy as in the proof of Lemma 8, one can apply Inequalities D12, D13, D16 and D17 to vectors X i ± Y i , which immediately gives Inequality D14 thanks to the union bound.
We now turn to the PE test. We want to upper bound the probability of the following bad event:
where the covariance matrices of the statesρ Σc,2σz Σ b,2 ½2 . This event corresponds to making at least one bad prediction for the various covariance matrix elements of the stateρ n i . Theorem 10. The probability of the event
is upper bounded by ǫ P E .
Proof. We will show that each individual event of the form [Σ a,1 ≥ γ
] has probability at most ǫ PE /6. The union bound then proves the result. Consider first the estimation of Σ a,2 performed by the simulated A 1 and B 1 : the union bound gives 
For n large enough, and choosing x = log(2/ǫ), it implies that:
Pr Σ a,2 ≥ 1 2n 1 + 5 log(2/ǫ) n X 2 − 1 ≤ 2ǫ.
Finally, with the definition of γ a given in Eq. 3, one obtains: Pr [Σ a,2 ≥ γ a ] ≤ ǫ PE /6. Similarly, one can compute a confidence region for Σ c,2 for instance: for n large enough 
It is very natural to conjecture that a better version of the Postselection technique, exploiting all the symmetries of the protocol in phase-space could be sufficient to prove the security of the protocol without any need for active symmetrization. Finally, it should be noted that a similar kind of active symmetrization seems to be also required for protocols such as BB84 if Alice and Bob discard all the events where Bob's detectors did not register a photon. Indeed, postselecting on the events where the detectors clicked is a form of reverse reconciliation which breaks a priori the symmetry of the protocol, i.e. its invariance under joint permutations of the subsystems of Alice and Bob in this case. For BB84, performing an active symmetrization of the data means drawing uniformly at random a permutation of size n, a task with complexity O(n log n). Of course, this is doable in theory, but not really practical.
For this reason, the question of symmetrization is not relevant only for CV QKD, but also for protocols such as BB84 when considered in a practical setting where losses are large.
